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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

FIRST EQUITY CORPORATION OF
FLORIDA, a Florida corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
-vsUTAH STATE UNIVERSITY, a body
politic and corporate, and
DONALD A* CATRON, an individual,

CASE NO,
13798

Defendants-Respondents•
BEAR-STEARNS & C O . , HARRIS
UPHAM & C O . , I N C . , HORNBLOWER
& WEEKS-HEMPHILL, NOYES, I N C . ,
LEHMAN BROTHERS, I N C . , MERRILL
LYNCH, P I E R C E , FENNER & SMITH,
I N C . , SHEARSON, HAYDEN, STONE,
I N C . a n d SUTRO & C O . , I N C . ,
Amici

Curiae.

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE

' STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a suit by a broker - First Equity Corporation - against its customer - Utah State University - and
against the University's employee - Donald A. Catron - for
losses from the sale of stock the customer failed to pay for
and for commissions.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On cross motions for summary judgment under Rule 56,
the University's motion was granted and First Equity's motion
was denied.

First Equity appealed from the granting of the
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University's Motion for Summary Judgment and the denial of
its Motion for Summary Judgment.

:;'••*

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
First Equity and Amici Curiae seek reversal of both
Summary Judgments and remand of the case for further proceedings.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 20, 1972, the Institutional Council of
Utah State University authorized defendant Dona."id Ac Catron
by a formal corporate resolution to buy and sell common stock
with any nationally recognized brokerage house (R, 151}.
The resolution provided:
BE IT RESOLVED: That this corporation ia authorized and empowered to open and maintain an
account with any broker who is a member of any
of the major security exchanges or the National
Association of Security Dealers for the purchase, trade, and sell, long or short, transfer,
and assign, stocks, bonds, and securities of
every nature on margin or otherwise, and that
any of the officers hereinafter named be, and
hereby is, authorized to give written or verbal,
instructions to the brokers concerning the herein named transactions * * * (R. 137).
Donald A. Catron and D* A* Broadbent, were designated
as the officers empowered to open and maintain such accounts
(R. 137). Mr. Catron was Controller and Assistant Vice-President of Finance of the University at the time (R. 137)*

The

resolution provided further that it would remain in full force
and effect until written notice of revocation was delivered
to each broker acting for the University (R. 137).
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In October, 19 72, pursuant to the resolution, Mr* Catron
opened an account with First Equity, a member of the National
Association of Securities Dealers.

Between October, 1972 and

January, 1973, First Equity purchased various stocks for the
University upon the express direction of Mr. Catron.

Upon

delivery of those stocks, the University paid for them in the
ordinary course of business (R„ 160-61)*
On January 17, 1973, Catron directed First Equity to
purchase 5,000 shares of Advanced Memory Systems for the
University's account.

On January 31, 1973, Catron directed

First Equity to purchase 24,100 shares of Panelrama and on
February 28, 1973, 83,800 shares of Great Basin Petroleum,
55,700 shares of Cordura, and 13,000 shares of Natoma (R. 251).
In each of these transactions, First Equity was acting as agent for the University (R. 140-49, 247). In each
of these transactions, Donald A. Catron directed First
Equity to purchase these stocks for the University (R. 251).
On March 13, 19 73, First Equity delivered the shares
of Advanced Memory Systems. The University refused to pay
for the shares and informed First Equity that it would not
honor the other purchases of January 31 and February 28,
1973 (R. 247, 251).
That refusal was the first suggestion received by
First Equity that Catron or the University may not have had
authority to purchase the stocks (R. 247-48).
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All of the purchases by the University through First
Equity involved in this case occurred after the University
claims to have revoked Catron's authority and after the University received notice from the Attorney General's Office that
there may have been a question concerning the University's
power to invest in common stocks, at least as to some of its
funds (R. 153).
Despite this knowledge, the University failed to give
any notice to plaintiff until March, 1973 (R. 160-61)*

This

failure to give notice occurred even though First Equity had
been regularly purchasing stocks for the University since
October, 1972, when Catron admittedly had express authority to
place orders for the purchase of stock and the University had
paid for such stock in the regular course of business (R, 358)c
Upon the University's refusal to pay for the shares
delivered on March 13, 1973, First Equity filed a Complaint
in the District Court of Cache Countyf Utah, against the
University and Catron for the loss on resale of Advanced
Memory Systems and for commissions on the purchase on January
31, and February 28. Motions for Summary Judgment were made
by both First Equity and the University based on the allegations' of the Complaint (R. 238, 433). The University's motion
was limited to its First Affirmative Defense, i.e., that the
Complaint failed to state a claim because the University was
not authorized to invest in common stocks (R. 4 33). No motion
was filed as to Catron.
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After oral argument, First Equity's Motion for Summary
Judgment was denied and the University's Motion for Summary
Judgment was granted on the ground that (1) Utah Code Annotated, Sections 33-1-1 and 33-1-3, provide what investments
may be made by a public corporation or political or public
body and (2) First Equity could not recover damages where it
did not deliver the securities purchased within the time
period provided in Regulation T of the Federal Reserve Board
(R. 258-59).
Summary Judgment was granted in favor of the University despite the undisputed fact that Catron had received
written authorization to purchase common stock from the
Institutional Council of the University? that he had been
exercising this authority over a period of months? that
First Equity had been regularly dealing with Catron for
several months; that the University did not inform First
Equity at any time that Catron's authority or that the
powers of the University were restricted in any way,
ARGUMENT
POINT

I

THE COURT BELOW ERRED BECAUSE EVEN ASSUMING,
ARGUENDO, THAT THE UNIVERSITY ACTED ULTRA VIRES,
FIRST EQUITY IS NOT BARRED FROM RELIEF,
Even assuming, arguendo, contrary to the law (see
Points III and IV, infra), that the University was without
power to purchase common stocks, it does not follow that

-5-
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First Equity is barred from recovering its commissions and
losses incurred while acting as agent for the University.
In all of the transactions mentioned in the Complaint,
First Equity was acting only as the agent of the University
(R. 140-49).

All of the orders placed by Catron were un-

solicited (R. 140-49).

First Equity faithfully carried out

the instructions of its principal in each of the subject
transactions.

It follows, for the reasons stated below,

that whether or not the University had the "power** to engage
in these transactions was not relevant to the issues resolved
by the trial court.
While acting as the University.1 s .agent in these transactions, First Equity's only duty to the University was "to
obey the instructions of his principal and exercise ;fn his
employment reasonable skill and ordinary diligence,11

^t^te

Automobile & Casualty Underwriters v. Salisbury, 27 U. 2d 229 ,
494 P.2d 529, 531 (1972).
There is nothing in the record which even suggests that
First Equity breached that duty.

On the contrary, First Equity

would have breached its duty if it had failed to follow
Catron1s instructions to execute the unsolicited orders placed
by him.

First Equity has fulfilled its duty to the University

and is entitled to compensation for the services performed in
the fulfillment of that duty.
The Utah Supreme Court in McCollum v. Clothier, 121
Utah 311, 241 P.2d 468 (1952), said:
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The question of moment, then, is as to the
authorization of this work. The rule applicable to this situation is contained in the
Restatement of Agency, Vol. 2, Sec. 441:
"Except for the relationship of the parties,
the triviality of the services, or other
circumstances indicate that the parties have
agreed otherwise, it is inferred that one
who requests or permits another to perform
services for him as his agent promises to
pay for them." [241 P.2d 470.]
And, as to the loss on the sale by First Equity of
the Advanced Memory Systems stock after the University refused
to pay for it, First Equity is entitled to be indemnified by
the University.
The agent's right of indemnity always includes a right to reimbursement for amounts
properly paid for losses suffered without his
fault in transactions authorized by the principal. [Restatement (2nd) of Agencyf Explanatory Notes, Section 4 38, Comment B 324 (May 23,
1957)].
The University relies upon a general rule that a person dealing with a governmental entity acts at his peril with
respect to the powers of that entity.

Assuming, arguendo,

that such a general rule would have application to the other
party to an executory contract, it can have no application
whatsoever to a person who acts as the agent of the governmental entity.

Were the law otherwise, every employee of

every public corporation in this state would incur personal
liability for any act purportedly taken on behalf of the
public corporation which exceeded the powers of that corporation even though the act was ordered and directed by the
employer.

The duties of First Equity do not change because
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the University is a public corporation even if acting ultra
vires in investing in common stocks.
The defense of ultra vires is available only as a
shield against the other party to the ultra vires contract.
It cannot be used as a sword against one's own agent who has
acted faithfully in the execution of its principal f s orders,
and without negligence or lack of due diligence.
The University cites no case which stands for the proposition that the defense of ultra vires by a municipal corporation can be used against its own agent in a suit brought
by that agent for compensation for services already rendered
and for losses incurred in the performance of the agent's
duties to that principal.
The law is to the contrary.

An agent can recover for

the value of his services and for losses incurred xn the performance of his duties to the principal if the agent has
acted in good faith and with due diligence.

Recovery can be

had even if the contract entered into by the agent for the
principal is voidable or even tortious.

Restatement (2nd)

of Agency, Section 439, 457 (1957) stalest
Unless otherwise agreed, a principal is subject to a duty to exonerate an agent who is
not barred by the illegality of his conduct
to indemnify him for:
(a) authorized payments made by the agent
on behalf of the principal;
(b) payments upon contracts upon which
the agent is authorized to make himself liable,
and upon obligations arising from the possession or ownership of things which he is authorized to hold on account of the principal;
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(c) payments of damages to third persons
which he is required to make on account of the
authorized performance of an act which constitutes a tort or a breach of contract . • .
•k

-k -k -k ic

A principal for whom an agent has performed
services in accordance with a voidable contract which is avoided by one of the parties,
or for whom an agent or purported agent has
performed services without a promise by the
principal to pay, is subject to liability to
the agent to the extent that he has been unjustly enriched by such services.
The rules of the Restatement were applied in the
Utah Supreme Court case of Hoggan v.Cahoon, 26 Utah 444,
73 P. 542 (1903).
had

There suit was brought by an agent who

committed the tort of conversion without knowledge of

the wrong while taking property on behalf of his principal
and at the direction of his principal.

The Court allowed

recovery stating:
[0]n the other hand, where the agent acts
innocently and without notice of the wrong,
the law will imply a promise on the part of
the principal to indemnify him. The same
doctrine applies to all other cases of losses
or damages sustained by an agent in the course
of the business of his agency, if they are
incurred without any negligence or default on
his own part. [73 P. 514]
Even if the contracts complained of were ultra vires,
which they were not, that defense can be asserted by the
University only against the other party to the contract.
First Equity performed its agency with due diligence and is
entitled to its compensation for services rendered and to
indemnity against loss incurred in the performance of that
agency.
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The ultra vires argument, as made by the University,
is simplistic.

It does not follow from the fact, if it be

a fact, that an act, ultra vires for one purpose, is ultra
vires for all purposes.

Nor is it true that ultra vires

contracts cannot support a claim for relief*
Finally, even if it is assumed, arguendo, that the
University is akin to a municipal corporation which acted
ultra vires and First Equity's status as agent is not relevant^ it still does not follow that First Equity is barred
from recoverys there being no specific* statutory prohibitions
against the University's investing in-common stocks.
In Baker Lumber Co. v. A, A. Clark, et al, 53 Utah 3 36,
178 Pc 764 (1919), the Utah Supreme Court drew a distinction
between contracts entered into by inunicipai corporations which
were specifically prohibited by law and contracts which were
merely beyond the power of the municipality to ma e.

In

Baker, the Utah Supreme Court held that a school district
was obligated to pay interest on warrants in accordance with
its contract with a school builder despite the fact that the
original issuance of warrants was not expressly authorized.
The Court stated:
There is no express provision in the statutes
of this state authorizing school boards or other
public corporations to"issue interest-bearing
warrants. There is a provision relating to
interest on school bonds issued after authority
obtained from the qualified electors of the
several school districts, and the rate of interest for such indebtedness is that the bonds so
issued shall bear interest not exceeding five
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per cent per annum, payable annually or
semi-annually. Manifestly that provision
of the statute does not relate to and does
not govern where the facts are as in this
case. It is further contended that the great
weight of authority, in the absence of
express statutory provisions, is that warrants issued by public corporations do not
bear interest.
•k -k

-k

-k -k

In this action, as indicated, the debt
was due at the time the building was accepted.
The school board was authorized to contract
to pay the debt at that date. We are unable
to understand why a public corporation should
not be required to meet its obligations the
"same as any other body authorized to contract
debts, and upon a failure to make payment at
the time agreed why it should not be required
to pay interest for any forbearance as an
individual. Moreover, this court has recognized that a public corporation, where it had
received the benefit of goods, should pay the
legal rate from the date it received the benefit of its contract. [Emphasis added; 53 Utah
350] .
Why in this case should the University be permitted
to speculate in the stock market and pass its losses on to
its own broker?

Why should it not meet its obligations the

same as any other investor?
POINT II
THE COURT BELOW ERRED BECAUSE THE UNIVERSITY
IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING THAT THE CONTRACTS
COMPLAINED OF WERE ULTRA VIRES.
The University is equitably estopped to deny that it
lacks power or authority to enter into the transactions complained of.

As the United States Supreme Court has succinctly

stated:
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[T]he principles of right and justice,
upon which the doctrine of estoppel in pais
rests, are applicable to municipal corporations . . . [Beadles v. Smyser, 209 U.S. 393,
402 (1908)].
Application of the principle of estoppel is the same
against municipalities or public corporations as against individuals or private corporations:
The doctrine of estoppel is generally
applied against local governments, so as to
prevent them from denying their contracts,
under the same general rules governing individuals and private corporation?* [1 A
Antieaur Municipal Corporation Law, Section
10.10 (1973)]„
The principle of estoppel applied to municipal corporations has been consistently recognized in Utah,

Tooele

City v. Elkington,lQ0 Utah 485, 116 P,2d 406 (1941).
The elements giving rise to an estoppel a.r^ stated in
Migliaccio v. Davis, 120 Utah 1, 7, 232 P.2d 195, 198 (1951)
as follows:
[1] The general rule of equitable estoppel
is set forth in the following language in .19
Am Jur., page 634, Sec. 34: '* * * Equitable
estoppel or estoppel in pais is the principle
by which a party who knows or should know the
truth is absolutely precluded, both at law and
in equity, from denying or asserting the contrary
of, any material fact, which, by his words or
conduct, affirmative or negative, intentionally
or through culpable negligence, he has induced
another, who was excusably ignorant of the true
facts and who had a right to rely upon such
words and conduct, to believe and act upon them
thereby, as a consequence reasonably to be anticipated, changing his position in such a way
that he would suffer injury if such denial or
contrary assertion were allowed.
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Every element listed in Migliaccio is present in
this case. The University, on January 20, 1972, adopted
a corporate resolution authorizing Catron to purchase
common stocks with any nationally recognized brokerage
house.

The University held Catron out as its authorized

agent in that resolution to purchase and order such stocks
(R. 160-61).
From October, 1972, to December, 1972, First Equity
in the regular course of business, delivered stock and the
University paid for it.

In March, 1973, the University

abruptly and inconsistently changed its position by asserting that it never had the power or authority to purchase
the stocks in the first place.

First Equity, in reliance

upon the University's actions, changed its position to its
injury by executing orders for the purchase of stock on behalf of the University and for its account.
On December 15, 1972, prior to the transactions in
question, the University was placed on notice by the Attorney General's Office that there might be a question concerning the University's power to purchase common stock (R. 153).
The University did not notify First Equity of this question
until three months later, after the contracts complained of
had been entered into (R. 160-61).

First Equity was without

notice of any question concerning the corporate resolution
until after all of the transactions had been entered into.
The facts here are similar to those in the Utah
Supreme Court decision of Wall v. Salt Lake City, 50 Utah
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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593 (1917) , and for this reason should compel the same
result.

In Wall the City of Salt Lake was estopped from

claiming ownership of certain real property after the
plaintiff who occupied the land had purchased it upon
reliance of a formal resolution of the City Council that
the property was private and after plaintiff had paid property taxes upon the same assessed by the City.

Because the

court held that the City was so estopped/ it did not bother
to inquire whether the City did in fact have proper title
to the property.
Based upon the foregoingf the doctrine of estoppel
in pais should be applied to this case and the oriers of the
trial court should be vacated.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE UNIVERSITY'S
CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE""A
GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT HAD"NOT BEEN RESOLVED,
The Court below found in paragraph 2 of its Order Denying First Equity's motion for summary judgment (R. 435B)

f

entered simultaneously with its Order granting the University's
motion, that:
There is at least a triable issue of fact
whether USU, at the time Catron ordered the
stock in question or the time payment for said
stock fell due, had funds which it had received from individual grants or development contracts sufficient to pay for part or all of
said stock • .
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in
pertinent part:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The [summary] judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
[emphasis added]
Because the Record on Appeal discloses that there
was a genuine issue as to whether non-appropriated funds
were available to pay, in whole or in part, for the
stocks ordered by the University, the Court's granting of
the University's motion for summary judgment was erroneous*
This is true without regard to the propriety of the trial
court's additional finding that the University may not invest
appropriated funds in common stocks. Accordingly, the order
granting such motion should be vacated and the matter remanded
to the Court below for further proceedings.
POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE UNIVERSITY'S
CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE
UNIVERSITY HAD THE POWER TO INVEST STATE
APPROPRIATED MONIES IN ITS POSSESSION IN
COMMON STOCKS.
The Trial Court further erred in holding that the
University did not have power to invest appropriated funds
in common stocks.
The Court below grounded its order upon the mistaken
view

that the University had no power to invest State appro-

priated monies in common stocks (R. 435D) and that the
*

As noted above, this mistaken view was not relevant to
the issues resolved by the Trial Court.
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executory stock purchase contracts entered into between
the University and First Equity were thus ultra vires.
The Court1s action prevented recovery of funds which First
Equity expended at the direction and on behalf of the University and of the agency commissions which the University had
agreed to pay for these services.
Historically, the University has enjoyed broad general
powers to manage, control and invest its funds.

Both Terri-

torial and State legislative provisions granting these broad
powers to the University are discussed below.
The University was created by the Territorial Legislature in 1888. (Comp. Laws of Utah §§1.852, et seq. (1888)} .
The Act of the Territorial Legislature also created a Board
of Trustees to govern the University and declared the powers
and duties of that Board in section 1855 in part as followsz
The Trustees shall elect one of their number
a president, and shall appoint a superintendent,
a secretary and treasurer. Said trustees shall
take charge of the general interests of the
institution, and shall have power to enact bylaws and rules for the regulation of all its
concerns, not inconsistent with the laws of
the Territory. They shall have the general
control and supervision . * «. of all appropriations made by the Territory for the support of
the same . . . [Emphasis added]
It is evident that the grant of "general control and
supervision . . •. of all appropriations • . .fl [emphasis added]
was meant to give the University substantial independence and
autonomy in handling State appropriations.

The foregoing

language was amended in 1929 by the Utah State Legislature in
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Section 15, Chapter 41, Laws of Utah (1929), when the State
Legislature restructured the University in certain respects
not pertinent here.

The new language provided in part:

The Board [of Trustees] shall have the general
control and supervision . . . of all appropriations made by the State of Utah or by Acts
of congress for the support of the same, and
also of lands or personal property that may
be hereafter donated by the State, or by the
United States, or by any person or corporation. [Emphasis added]
The foregoing language is even more comprehensive than the
original 1888 language, taking into account non-appropriated
as well as appropriated monies. The 1929 language was not
repealed by the Utah Legislature until 19 69, when the Higher
Education Act of 1969 (Utah Code Ann. §§53-48-1 (1953), et.
seq.) was adopted.
The 1969 Act generally provided for the reorganization of the bodies governing the University (e.g., substituting the Board of Higher Education for the Board of
Trustees) but did not alter the broad investment powers of
the University.

Consistent with the broad powers granted to

the University by the Territorial Legislature in 18 88 and
again by the State Legislature in 1929, the Utah Legislature
avoided a specification of how the University should handle
its finances when it reiterated the University's general
authority to manage its finances in the 19 69 Act (Utah Code
Ann. §53-48-10(5) (1953)):
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Each University and college and the Utah Technical College at Provo and the Utah Technical
College at Salt Lake City may do its own purchasing , issue its own payrolls, and handle
its own financial affairs under the general
supervision of the board [of Higher Education]
as provided in this act. [Emphasis added]
Again, a general, rather than a specific, grant of authority
is evident.
It is clear from all of the foregoing that the University has historically enjoyed broad powers, repeatedly given
it by the Legislature (both Territorial and State) F to handle
its finances from the date of its organization in 18 88 until
the time of the securities investments giving rise to this
lawsuit.
In view of these broad powers, it is unreasonable to
suppose^ in the absence of specific legislative provisions to
the contrary, that the University could not invest State appro•k

priated monies in common stocks.

And notwithstanding the

Moreover, if there is some doubt whether the general grants
of independent financial power to the University included the
power to invest in common stocks, this issue might be determined by the factual inquiry of whether the University has
in fact invested in common stocks over the years, indicating
that University officials construed the foregoing legislative
enactments as empowering the University to invest in stocks.
For this Court has previously held as a rule of statutory
construction that it is appropriate in Utah, in determining
the legislative intent of an ambiguous statutory or constitutional provision, to look to the acquiescence and practice
of those charged with conforming with the terms of the provision.
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Anderson, 30 Utah 2d 102,
106, 514 P.2d 217 (1973); and State Board of Education v.
State Board of Higher Education, 29 Utah 2d 110, 505 P.2d
1113 (1973). This factual issue, not resolved by the Court
below, alone would require vacating the order granting the
University's motion for summary judgment and remanding the
case for a determination of this factual question.
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erroneous holding of the Court below to the contrary,
there was no statutory provision specifically prohibiting
the University from so investing funds in its possession.
The Court below incorrectly held that Utah Code
Ann. §33-1-1 precluded the University from investing State
appropriated monies in stocks (R. 4 35D).

This was error

because it is apparent from the plain language of the
statute that the foregoing provision is not enabling in
nature.

It does not prohibit by its terms any investment;

the section simply authorizes investments in numerous kinds
of property.

This may be seen from the entire text of the

section which is set forth in the Appendix.
Section 33-1-1 by its express terms applies with
equal impact to "any private, political, or public instrumentality, body, corporation or person."

Hence, if the

section were deemed to be enabling, it would prohibit any
person or corporation from purchasing any corporate stock.
Manifestly, this cannot be so.

Section 33-1-1 thus does not

forbid investment by the University or any other legal
entity in common stocks.
Section 33-1-1 is best viewed as neither a grant of
new authority nor a denial of authority not expressly therein given.

The provision is simply declarative of the pre-

sumptive legality of certain investments without being
exclusive.

Indeed, Section 33-1-3, in referring to Section

33-1-1 and other sections, specifically provides in part that:
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The provisions of this act are supplemental to
any and all other laws relating to and declaring what shall be legal investments for the
persons, corporations . . . referred to in this
act . . . [Emphasis added]
Moreover, the Utah Legislature demonstrated that it
did not regard Section 33-1-1 as enabling when it enacted the
State Money Management Act on February 2r 1974, which Act
for the first time made unlawful certain common stock investments by the University.
Code Ann, §§51-7-1 et

Chapter 27 Laws of Utah (1974)-j Utah

seg. (Interim Supp. ' 19 74). .

The Act is of interest here for several reasons - which
include:
1.

The Act specifically amends all sections of the

existing law which are changed by the Act*

Conspicuous by

its absence from those sections of existing laws amended is
Section 33-1-1. This is consistent with the non-enabling
interpretation of Section 33-1-1 which is presented herein.
If the Section were enabling,- it would have been repealed by
the Money Management Act.
2.

The Act excepts for different treatment in Section

4(1) (c):
Funds of member institutions of the state
system of higher education: (i) acquired by
gift, devise, or bequest, or by federal or
private contract or grant; (ii) derived from
student fees or from income from operations,
of auxiliary enterprises which fees and income
are pledged or otherwise dedicated to the payment of interest and principal of bonds issued
by such institutions; and (iii) any other funds
which are not included in the institution's
work program as approved by the state board
of higher education.
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After giving the problem of investments by the
Universities its serious attention, the Legislature in
its wisdom elected to apply substantially different rules
to funds from the named origins. (See Sections 20 and 21).
Again, there is no reference to an amendment of Section
33-1-1.
3.

Other University funds are defined as "public

funds" and are governed by "criteria" described in Section
19 which authorizes numerous investments not listed in Section 33-1-1.

Again, this action, without reference to or

amendment of Section 33-1-1, suggests that the Utah Legislature does not share the views of the Court below as to
the meaning of 33.-1-1.
4.

Section 2(b) of the Money Management Act states

as one of the purposes of the Act:
To establish and maintain a continuing statewide policy for the deposit and investment of
public funds; [Emphasis added]
This stated purpose is yet another legislative expression
which does not appear to us to be consistent with the view
that 33-1-1 is enabling.

If the Court below were correct, a

continuous state-wide policy was already in existence and
the Legislature would not have needed to establish or maintain a new policy.
For the foregoing reasons, Section 33-1-1 is not
enabling in nature and thus did not prohibit investment of
appropriated funds by the University in common stocks at the
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time here pertinent.

This, combined with the numerous general

grants of independent financial powers repeatedly bestowed
upon the University by the Territorial and State Legislature
in the last 80 years, makes it unreasonable to suppose that
the University lacked power to invest appropriated funds in
common stock, prior to 19 74, when the Legislature for the
first time specifically provided that such investments would
henceforth be unlawful.

It follows that the Court below erred

and that the order granting summary judgment should be vacated,
POINT V
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN DENYING FIRST EQUITY1^
MOTION BECAUSE FIRST EQUITY'S VIOLATION OF REGULATION T DOES NOT "CREATE AN ABSOLUTE DEFENSE FOP
THE UNIVERSITY.
At the time the Court entered its order granting the
University1s motion for summary judgment (R. 435D), it also
entered an order denying First Equity1s motion for summary
judgment (R. 435A).

The Trial Court premised denial of First

Equity's motion in part upon a legal conclusion that violation by
First Equity of Regulation T promulgated by the Federal Reserve
Board

(12 CFR'220.4) gave the University an absolute defense

to First Equity's claims for damages as a matter of law (R.
435B).

Specifically, the Court stated in this connection in

Regulation T makes it unlawful for a broker-dealer to extend
credit to a customer beyond certain limits, although the
Regulation does not expressly provide a customer with a right
of action or a defense when a broker-dealer violates Regulation T. Regulation T was promulgated pursuant to Section
7(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 USCA 78g(a).
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its Memorandum Decision (R. 259) that:
This decision is also based on the fact that
the plaintiff cannot recover damages where
it did not deliver the securities purchased
within the time period provided in Regulation
T of the Federal Reserve Board . . . [T]he
court holds and feels that . . . failure to
deliver within the thirty-five days is a full
and complete and valid defense in a state
court to attempt to collect damages.
The Trial Courtfs view is erroneous; a plaintiff
broker-dealer's violation of Regulation T does not give
rise to a complete defense for the defendant customer. The
Federal cases

have held that a cause of action arises

(and presumably also a defense) only where the customer is
a small investor, Gammage v. Roberts, Scott & Co. [Current
Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L.R. 1194,760 (S.D. .Calif •; 1974) ?
Remar v. Clayton Securities Corp,/ 81 F.Supp. 1014 (D* Mass.
1949) , and when a cause of action does arise it is subject
to traditional tort defenses, Moscarelli v» Stamm, 288 F.
Supp. 453 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); and Goldman v. Bank of the
Commonwealth, 467 F.2d 439 (6th Cir. 1972).
The University's defense in this connection is
defeated as a matter of law because (1) the University is
not a small, but rather a large, sophisticated investor,
and because (2) the University's violation of Regulation X

*

Most cases treating Regulation T issues are Federal decisions because Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction
of actions brought under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 USCA §78(a). State courts only have jurisdiction of Federal Reserve regulation questions when, as
here, they are raised as a defense.
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of the Federal Reserve Board (12 CFR 224)

rendered it in

pari delecto to First Equity's violation of Regulation T as
a matter of law.

But, even if this were not so, there would

be genuine issues of material fact as to whether the University's conduct was in. pari delecto.
In Gammage v. Roberts, Scott & Co. [Current Binder]
CCH Fed. Sec. L.R. 1(94,760 (S.D. Calif. 1974) the plaintiff
who claimed violations of Regulation T was an active participant in the stock market who independently researched stocks
to buy and developed his own investment strategies (similar
to Catron here.)

The court stated that to imply a private

right of action under these facts "would shock the conscience
and war with common sense."

The court acknowledged the exist-

ence of a legislative intent to protect small investors, the
"innocent lambs" of the stock market, but no intent to protect the individual interests of an experienced investor (such
as the University here.)
If the University, a sophisticated institutional investor, were given the defense it asserts, it would fly in the
face of the dominantly fiscal purpose of Regulation T.

Gammage,

"k

Regulation X makes it unlawful for a customer to accept
credit extended by a creditor in violation of Regulation T
and other Federal Reserve regulations. Regulation X was
promulgated in 1971 pursuant to Section 7(f) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and no court has yet ruled whether
a customer's violation of Regulation X renders him in pari
delecto to a broker-dealer's violation of Regulation T.
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supra, at page 96,501.

Institutional investors like the

University would be induced to invest their enormous resources and thereafter participate in activities encouraging and permitting violations of Regulation T with the
knowledge that if the value of securities purchased declines,
they may avoid payment as the University is attempting to
do here.

This could only aggravate the very practice Regu-

lation T is designed to prevent, the over-extension of
credit in the nation's stock markets and the diversion of
credit into speculative markets away from more desirable
investments such as commerce and industry.

Regulation T

might be secondarily intended to protect the small investor,
the "lamb" as characterized in Gammage, supra, but not the
large institutional investor such as the University.

For

this reason alone, the defense is not available to the University.
In any case, the University's claimed defense is
barred by traditional rules applied to the common law of
torts.

In Moscarelli v. Stamm, 288 P.Supp. 453 (E.D.N.Y.

1968) the plaintiff-investor had conspired with a broker in
H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong. 2nd Sess. 8 (1934) sets forth
the purpose of the Federal Reserve Regulations:
The main purpose is to give a Government credit
agency an effective method of reducing the aggregate amount of the nation's credit resources which
can be diverted by speculation into the stock market and out of other more desirable uses of commerce
and industry — to prevent a recurrence of the precrash situation where funds which would otherwise
have been available at normal interest rates for use
of local commerce, industry and agriculture, were
drained by far higher rates into security loans and
theDigitized
New byYork
call
market.
[Emphasis
added]
the Howard
W. Hunter
Law Library, J. Reuben
Clark Law School,
BYU.
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the defendant's employ to violate Federal Reserve regulations.
The plaintifffs accounts were eventually liquidated at a loss
to the plaintiff.

In exercising the private right of action,

Moscarelli claimed that the broker's liability for Regulation
T violations was absolute, regardless of the complicity of
the investor.

In rejecting this argument, the Moscarelli

court held at pages 459-60 of its opinion:
It follows that the broker's implied civil liability 'is not absolute but is subj ect to the
traditional tort concepts of causation and contributory negligence or analogous conduct.
In another action, Goldman v. Bank of Commonwealth, 4 67
F.2d 439 (6th Cir. 1972), the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit reached a similar conclusion.

In this case the plain-

tiff obtained loans from the defendant bank in order to purchase stock.

The bank made the transactions in violation of

Regulation U margin requirements.

*

However, the bank had been

deceived by the plaintiff as to the true purpose of the loans.
When the plaintiff became unable to repay the loans, he sought
to have them declared void as being in violation of Regulation
U.

In rejecting the plaintiff!s claim, the court stated at

page 446:
The present action is a common law action in
tort to recover damages for violation of a
federal statute or regulation. Common law
defenses are therefore available to the defendant.

Regulation U, similar to Regulation T, limits the amount of
credit banks may loan for the purchase of securities.
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The alleged

Regulation T violations upon which

the University asserts its defense occurred subsequent to
the effective date of Regulation X in 1971.

The Univer-

sity, under its own allegations, clearly violated Section
7(f) and Regulation X as a matter of law by obtaining,
receiving and enjoying the use of an unlawful extension
of credit.

Under such circumstances, as a matter of law,

the University may not raise a defense based upon First
Equity's alleged violation of Regulation T.

If such a

defense were permitted under the circumstances of this case,
the whole purpose of Regulation X to restrain illegal credit
would be defeated.

Also, if a borrower who is in pari

delecto were permitted to avoid liability for its own
illegal conduct, the legislative intention of Regulation X
would be negated.
In view of the very limited circumstances under which
a Regulation T violation will give rise to a private right
of action, if at all, we submit that, to state a claim or a
defense based upon a broker-dealer1s violation of Regulation
T, the claimant (here, the University) must affirmatively
establish that its action was not .in pari delecto and was
not in violation of Regulation X.

The University did not

establish that it was not iri pari delecto because it is
clear as a matter of law that the University's violation of
Regulation X rendered it in pari delecto to First Equity's
violation of Regulation T.

And even if First Equity is not
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held to be in pari delecto on this record as a matter of
law, the issue still remains as one of f&ct.
The University1s Regulation T defense is without
merit on this record.

The order denying First Equity's

motion for summary judgment on this ground should be vacated*
CONCLUSION
Utah State University, through its Institutional
Council, authorized Catron to "'purchase, trade, and sell,
long or short, stocks and securities of every nature on
margin or otherwise * . .M / A formal corporate resolution so
providing was adopted on January 20, 1972,
In January, 19 72, the Dow Jones Industrial Average was
at a high point and market optimism reigned.
vor was intense.

Speculative fer-

Some thought Wall Street was a one-way street.

All thought the market would go higher.

It was in this con-

text that the University gave Catron Carte Blanche.
The market did go higher and reached an all-time high
in early 19 72.

On January 17, 1973 Catron ordered First

Equity to buy 5,000 shares of Advanced Memory Systems for the
account of the University.

On January 31, Catron ordered

24,000 shares of Panelrama and on February 28, 83,811 shares
of Great Basin Petroleum, 55,700 shares of Cordura and 13,000
shares of Natomas. (R. 251)
However, it turned out that Catron was behind the market*
When he refused delivery of the Memory stock, the market had
fallen drastically.

Some purchasers of common stock accepted
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their losses.

Some, as here, sued their brokers.

But, to

succeed in a suit against one's own agent broker, it is
necessary to show breach of agency duty-

None is even

claimed here.
There is no claim in this case that Utah State University was promoted, touted or even encouraged to buy common
stocks by First Equity, to say nothing as to any particular
common stock.
First Equity did not tell Catron that treasury bills
and bonds were for widows and orphans.

Catron, himself, made

the decision for the University that common stocks were more
suitable for their investment objectives than bills or bonds
and Catron himself, on behalf of the University, directed
action by First Equity in each transaction here involved.
The University cannot avoid liability to its own agent for
acts which it directed.

Its remedies, if any, are against

other principals in the transactions involved.
The judgment of the Trial Court should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
PARSONS, BEHLE Sc LATIMER
79 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
and
WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSEN
700 Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Amici Curiae
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APPENDIX
Set forth below is the complete text of Utah Code
Ann. §33-1-1 (1953) which the lower Court erroneously
interpreted as enabling and thus barring the University
from investing in common stocks*

33-1-1. Investments in certain securities
declared lawful. - On and after the passage
of this act investment by receivers, insurance
companies of whatever type or nature, building and loan associations, savings and loan
associations and other financial institutions,
charitable, educational, eleemosynary and public corporations and organizations, municipalities and other public corporations and bodies,
mutual assessment insurance companies, mutual
benevolent and benefit associations; or investment of funds of any state insurance fund,
state sinking fund, state school fund, firemen's relief and pension fund, police pension
fund, or other pension fund; or investment by
any administrative department, board, commission or officer of the state government, and
of any county government, authorized by law to
make investments of funds in the custody or
under the control of such department, board,
commissions, or officer, school district or
township, or the investment by any private,
political, or public instrumentality, body,
corporation or person of their own funds or
funds in their possession in bonds and other
obligations of or bonds or obligations guaranteed as to interest and principal by the United
States; bonds or debentures issued by any
federal home loan bank in accordance with the
provisions of the Federal Home Loan Bank Act as
now or hereafter amended; consolidated federal
home loan bank bonds or debentures issued by
the federal home loan bank board in accordance
with the provisions of the Federal Home Loan
Bank Act as now or hereafter amended; farm
loan bonds, consolidated farm loan bonds, debentures, consolidated debentures and other obligations issued by federal land banks and federal
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intermediate credit banks under the authority
of the Federal Farm Loan Act approved July 17,
1916, as now or hereafter amended (Title 12,
U.S.C. sections 636-1012 and sections 1021112 9), and the bonds, debentures, consolidated
debentures and other obligations issued by banks
for co-operatives under the authority of the
Farm Credit Act of 1933, as now or hereafter
amended (Title 12 U.S.C, sections 1131-1138f);
bonds or debentures issued by the federal
savings and loan insurance corporation in accordance with the provisions of Title IV of the
National Housing Act as nov; or hereafter amended;
in shares or accounts of building and loan associations which have been insured by the federal
savings and loan insurance corporation and
shares or accounts of federal savings and loan
associations incorporated under the provisions
of the Home Owners1 Loan Act of 19 33 as now or
hereafter amended; which have been insured by
the federal savings and loan insurance corporation to the extent to which the withdrawal or
repurchasable value of such shares or accounts
now are or may hereafter be insured by the
federal savings and loan insurance corporation
under the Acts of Congress of the United States
of America now in effect or which may hereafter
be enacted, shall be lawful. [Emphasis added]
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